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Apprendi after Miller and Graham  
HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT 
JURISPRUDENCE ON JUVENILES PROHIBITS THE 
USE OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AS 
MANDATORY “SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS” 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 12, 2011, in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Cory Devon 
Washington was sentenced after pleading guilty to two counts 
of firearm possession—felon in possession of a firearm and 
possession of an unregistered firearm.1 Under ordinary 
circumstances, Washington would have faced a maximum of 10 
years incarceration for such offenses.2 Washington, however, 
was sentenced to a minimum of 15 years after the sentencing 
judge applied the requirements of the Armed Career Criminal 
Act (ACCA). 
The ACCA is a federal law that sets mandatory 
minimum sentences of incarceration for crimes involving a 
firearm when the defendant has three prior convictions for a 
“violent felony” or “serious drug offense.”3 Washington had 
three prior involvements with the justice system, including two 
convictions as an adult—one for assault and battery and 
another for burglary—and a juvenile adjudication for pointing 
a weapon that was dismissed after Washington completed a 
five-month probationary sentence.4 Not only had the juvenile 
offense been dismissed, it had occurred when Washington was 
16 years old, nearly 20 years prior.5 But the sentencing judge 
 
 1 Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 5, United States v. Washington, 706 F.3d 
1215 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-6339), 2012 WL 1074455 at *5.  
 2 Id. at 11. 
 3 See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(1) (2012). 
 4 United States v. Washington, 706 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 5 Id. An additional argument made by the defendant in the Washington case 
was that the defendant’s juvenile adjudication should not be considered a conviction 
under the ACCA not only because it was a juvenile offense but also because it was 
actually dismissed after a period of probation See id. at 1218-19. The court did not find 
this argument convincing because Oklahoma state law does not automatically seal 
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determined that Washington’s juvenile offense of pointing a 
gun counted as a conviction for a violent felony under the 
ACCA, meaning that Washington had three prior convictions 
for violent felonies.6 Under the mandatory requirements of the 
ACCA, the court sentenced Washington to a minimum term of 
imprisonment of 15 years.7 
Washington’s case is only one of the stories in the 
ongoing question of how to treat prior juvenile adjudications 
when sentencing adult defendants who have violated federal or 
state laws. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court 
held that due process does not require the right to a jury trial 
in juvenile delinquency adjudications.8 In 2000, the Court held 
in Apprendi v. New Jersey that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”9 Failure to 
submit and prove such facts to a jury constitutes a violation of the 
defendant’s right to due process.10 The exclusion of convictions 
from this requirement has been commonly referred to as a 
“conviction exception” or the “Apprendi exception.”11 The intercept 
between Apprendi and McKeiver has resulted in disagreement 
over whether juvenile adjudications obtained without a jury trial 
guarantee can be counted as convictions, subject to the Apprendi 
exception, for the sentencing of adult defendants without running 
afoul of due process and violating the defendant’s rights under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
juvenile dismissals and because these cases are still relevant under state law for future 
sentencing purposes. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned such dismissals are also 
relevant under the ACCA. Id. This secondary argument presents an additional set of 
legal analysis that will not be dealt with at any length in this note. 
 6 Id. at 1217. 
 7 Id. 
 8 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 at 545-50 (1971). 
 9 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 426-27 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011); United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 262-64 (4th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 34 
(1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238 (2008); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 
744, 749 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1105 (2008); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 
1139, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 933 (2007); United States v. Burge 
407 F.3d 1183, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005); United 
States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 694-96 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004); 
United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1114 (2003); United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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A significant number of circuit courts have held that a 
juvenile adjudication counts as a conviction.12 Many in the 
scholarly community, however, have argued that juvenile 
adjudications should not count as previous convictions because 
of the absence of a jury trial guarantee.13 Thus, any sentencing 
scheme where the judge imposes a mandatory or enhanced 
sentence based on the adult defendant’s prior juvenile record, 
without submitting and proving this fact to the jury, is a 
violation of due process. This note will argue that a juvenile 
adjudication should not count as a conviction under the 
Apprendi exception: that based on the factual underpinnings of 
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the nature of juveniles 
in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida, the Court should 
conclude that the purpose of the juvenile court system prohibits 
courts from counting a juvenile delinquency adjudication as a 
“conviction” when sentencing adult defendants. Therefore, any 
sentencing scheme under which the judge imposes a mandatory 
or enhanced sentence based on the adult defendant’s prior 
juvenile record is a violation of due process. 
Part I will introduce Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
evolution of the juvenile court system and the extension of some 
procedural protections to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Part 
II will explain Apprendi v. New Jersey and the Court’s 
recognition of a “conviction exception.” Part III will discuss how 
federal courts have treated juvenile adjudications in light of the 
Apprendi exception. Part IV will discuss recent Supreme Court 
cases dealing with juveniles as a class distinguishable from 
adults, specifically the most recent cases of Miller v. Alabama 
and Graham v. Florida. Finally, in Part V, this note will 
address how Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida reflect a 
change in the Court’s perception of juveniles. It advances the 
 
 12 See e.g., Welch, 604 F.3d at 428-29; Wright, 594 F.3d at 264; Matthews, 498 
F.3d at 35; Crowell, 493 F.3d at 750; Burge 407 F.3d at 1191; Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696; 
Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033. 
 13 See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and 
McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality 
of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111 (2003); Jason Abbott, Note, 
The Use of Juvenile Adjudications Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 85 B.U. L. 
REV, 263 (2005); Douglas M. Schneider, Note, But I Was Just a Kid!: Does Using 
Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences Run Afoul of Apprendi v. New 
Jersey?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (2005); Brian P. Thill, Comment, Prior “Convictions” 
Under Apprendi: Why Juvenile Adjudications May Not Be Used to Increase an 
Offender’s Sentence Exposure If They Have Not First Been Proven to a Jury Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 573 (2004). But see Daniel Kennedy, Note, 
Nonjury Juvenile Adjudications as Prior Convictions Under Apprendi, 2004 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 267, Part IV & V (2004) (arguing that juvenile adjudications should fall under the 
conviction exception as they are reliable). 
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argument that, regardless of whether a juvenile adjudication 
was obtained by a jury, the Court’s view of juveniles as a class 
fundamentally distinct from adults prohibits equating juvenile 
adjudications with adult convictions under Apprendi. 
I.  SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE JUVENILE 
SYSTEM 
In the 1800s, Progressive Reformers pushed to create 
institutions and enact laws that would shape and mold the 
development of children.14  
The legal doctrine of parens patriae—the right and responsibility of 
the state to substitute its own control over children for that of the 
natural parents when the latter appeared unable or unwilling to 
meet their responsibilities or when the child posed a problem for the 
community—provided the formal justification to intervene.15  
The root of the juvenile justice system as a method of 
combating delinquency stems from “positivist ideology” and the 
notion of a “rehabilitative ideal,” requiring an individualized 
approach to each child and deference to professional opinions.16 
Progressive reformers imagined a court system where 
“professionals made discretionary, individualized treatment 
decisions to achieve benevolent goals and social uplift and 
substituted a scientific and preventive approach for the 
traditional punitive goals of the criminal law.”17 Adopting this 
flexible approach, and in an effort to avoid the stigmatization 
associated with the adult criminal system, reformers classified 
the juvenile court as a civil system where “petitions” were filed 
(as opposed to charges brought), “[c]ourts found youths to be 
‘delinquent’ rather than guilty of an offense, and youths 
received ‘dispositions’ rather than sentences.”18 
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court, however, concerned 
about the degree of power and discretion wielded by the State, 
stepped in to extend Constitutional protections to youths in the 
juvenile system. In 1967, the Supreme Court decided In re 
Gault, holding that while the juvenile system was different 
from the adult criminal system, the possibility of serious 
consequences such as confinement and loss of liberty required 
 
 14 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
JUVENILE COURT 34-45 (1999). 
 15 Id. at 52. 
 16 Id. at 60. 
 17 Id. at 62. 
 18 Id. at 68. 
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the imposition of procedural protections including the right to 
notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right to cross-
examine and confront witnesses, and the privilege against self-
incrimination.19 The facts of Gault vividly illustrated the 
potential for abuse given the wide discretion exercised in the 
juvenile court system. The defendant, Gerald Gault, was 
committed to custody for six years for making an obscene phone 
call, whereas an adult who committed the same offense would 
have faced a maximum punishment of a 50 dollar fine.20 
While the purported purpose of the juvenile court 
system is to rehabilitate juveniles, the Court recognized that 
“[t]he rhetoric of the juvenile court movement ha[d] developed 
without any necessarily close correspondence to the realities of 
court and institutional routines.”21 The facts of Gault exhibited 
such a glaring departure from the benevolent and rehabilitative 
ideal of the juvenile court that it spurred major constitutional 
change.22 Three years later, the Court held, in In re Winship, 
that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to the same criminal 
trial standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”23 
The Court extended many of the constitutional 
protections available to adult criminal defendants to juvenile 
defendants in recognition of the unavoidably adversarial 
nature of the juvenile system.24 Thus, in both Gault and 
Winship, the Court “emphasized the dual functions of 
constitutional criminal procedures to ensure accurate fact-
finding and to protect against governmental oppression.”25 
Especially telling was the Supreme Court’s decision that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied 
to juvenile court proceedings, demonstrating that despite the 
state’s benevolent motives, a juvenile still required certain 
fundamental protections against the power of the state.26 
The Court, however, seemed to take a step back from 
this philosophy not long after deciding Winship. At the end of 
 
 19 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4-58 (1967). 
 20 Id. at 29. 
 21 Id. at 30 (quoting STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 35 (1996)). 
 22 FELD, supra note 14, at 99-100. 
 23 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970). Several years before Gault was 
decided, Chief Justice Warren had foreshadowed the possibility of the decision when, 
speaking before the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, he acknowledged that 
the juvenile system was different from adult criminal court but expressed concern for 
the possibility of “unbridled caprice.” FELD, supra note 14, at 99 (1999). 
 24 FELD, supra note 14, at 101. 
 25 Id. at 104. 
 26 Id. at 101. 
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the same year Winship was decided, the Court heard 
arguments in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania on whether a jury trial 
is constitutionally required in a juvenile delinquency 
proceeding.27 The Court’s recognition in Gault and Winship 
that juvenile proceedings were in fact adversarial and could 
result in significant consequences despite their purpose of 
rehabilitation seemed to suggest that the Court would continue 
the trend of applying adult procedural protections to juvenile 
proceedings.28 Notably, between Gault and McKeiver, the Court 
had decided Duncan v. Louisiana, holding that the right to a 
jury in criminal prosecutions, guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, applied to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 
In McKeiver, the Court reiterated its holding in Duncan 
“that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice” but stated that Duncan  
does not automatically provide the answer to the present jury trial 
issue, if for no other reason than that the juvenile court proceeding 
has not yet been held to be a “criminal prosecution,” within the 
meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment, and also has not yet 
been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects merely because it 
usually has been given the civil label.30  
The Court acknowledged the failure of the juvenile 
system to achieve its idealistic goals, citing extensively from a 
Presidential Commission report detailing these failures.31 
However, the Court held that, nevertheless, “trial by jury in 
the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional 
requirement.”32 
The Court discussed Duncan at the beginning of its 
opinion, but it decided the issue based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process standard of “fundamental fairness,” 
without delving into the intricacies of a Sixth Amendment 
analysis.33 The Court’s avoidance of an explicit Sixth Amendment 
analysis suggests it was uncomfortable with classifying juvenile 
 
 27 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 528 (1971). 
 28 See FELD, supra note 14, at 101. 
 29 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see also FELD, supra note 
14, at 104. 
 30 McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528 at 540-41 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 31 Id. at 543-45. 
 32 Id. at 545. 
 33 Id. at 540-43; see also FELD, supra note 14, at 104 (“[T]he Supreme Court decided 
McKeiver solely on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and 
‘fundamental fairness’ without reference to the Sixth Amendment or its Duncan rationale.”). 
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delinquency adjudications either as entirely civil or entirely 
criminal matters. 
II.  APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY AND THE “CONVICTION 
EXCEPTION” 
Decades after the Supreme Court’s line of cases 
addressing constitutional protections in the juvenile system, 
the Court found itself facing constitutional claims in an 
entirely different area—the sentencing of adult defendants. In 
2000, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey.34 In 
Apprendi, under a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to 
two counts of possession of a firearm and one count of unlawful 
possession of a bomb.35 The state of New Jersey reserved the 
right to seek a higher sentence on one of the counts by applying 
the state’s “hate crime” statute, claiming that the crime was 
committed with a biased purpose based on a statement by 
Apprendi suggesting a racial motive.36 After the trial judge 
accepted the defendant’s guilty plea, the judge held an 
evidentiary hearing, without a jury present, to determine whether 
Apprendi’s acts were due to a biased purpose.37 The judge held 
that Apprendi’s actions met the statutory requirements “by a 
preponderance of the evidence” and that the sentencing 
enhancement under the hate crime statute applied.38 The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[o]ther than the fact of 
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”39 
The Apprendi Court did not expressly overturn 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania,40 a 1986 decision holding that a 
 
 34 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 35 Id. at 469-70. 
 36 Id. at 470; See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999–2000) (“The 
defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or 
group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual 
orientation or ethnicity.”). 
 37 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 470. 
 38 Id. at 471. 
 39 Id. at 490. The Court acknowledged that the Apprendi holding confirms a 
principle first expressed in a footnote to the Court’s opinion in Jones v. United States, 
concerning a federal statute. See id. at 476; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, 
n.6 (1999) (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice 
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than a prior 
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an 
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”). In Apprendi, 
the Court explained that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in 
this case involving a state statute.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 476. 
 40 See generally Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.  
354 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
“sentencing factor” could affect the judge’s sentencing decision 
even if it was not found by a jury.41 The Court in Apprendi 
made a point of stressing that in McMillan, it “did not, 
however, . . . budge from the position that (1) constitutional 
limits exist to States’ authority to define away facts necessary 
to constitute a criminal offense . . . [and (2)] a state scheme 
that keeps from the jury facts that ‘expos[e] [defendants] to 
greater or additional punishment,’ may raise serious 
constitutional concern.”42 
The Apprendi Court’s discussion of a “sentencing factor” 
was necessary for it to clarify how its decision fit in with 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, decided two years before 
Apprendi.43 In Almendarez-Torres, the Court held that the use 
of a previous conviction to sentence the defendant to a longer 
term constituted a “sentencing factor” and not an element of the 
crime that needed to be listed in an indictment.44 Therefore, it 
did not violate due process or other constitutional provisions.45 
The Almendarez-Torres holding applied only to criminal 
indictments and was not concerned with sentencing procedures. 
At issue in Almendarez-Torres was a federal statute enhancing 
the maximum prison term for a deported alien returning to the 
United States without permission, if he had previously been 
deported upon conviction of an aggravated felony.46 
The Apprendi Court explained that,  
[b]ecause Almendarez-Torres had admitted the three earlier 
convictions for aggravated felonies—all of which had been entered 
pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of 
their own—no question concerning the right to a jury trial or the 
standard of proof that would apply to a contested issue of fact was 
before the Court.47  
The Almendarez-Torres decision focused on the general 
characterization of recidivism as a “sentencing factor” that did 
not need to be charged in the indictment.48 As Almendarez-
Torres admitted to prior convictions for aggravated felonies, 
the Court never reached the question of what constituted a 
 
 41 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 485-86. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 
U.S. 79 (1986). 
 42 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 486 (2000) (citations omitted). 
 43 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998). 
 44 Id. at 226-27. 
 45 Id. at 226. 
 46 Id. at 224. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2) (2012). 
 47 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 488. 
 48 See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998). 
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“conviction” under the statute in issue.49 Consequently, the 
Apprendi Court did not overrule Almendarez-Torres because 
the facts of the case still fit within the Apprendi holding 
allowing for a “conviction exception” to the general rule that 
facts enhancing the sentence should go before a jury.50 The 
Court, however, went so far as to suggest that  
it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and 
that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the 
recidivist issue were contested. Apprendi does not contest the 
decision’s validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of our 
decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception to the general 
rule we recalled at the outset. Given its unique facts, it surely does 
not warrant rejection of the otherwise uniform course of decision 
during the entire history of our jurisprudence.51 
Recently, in Alleyne v. United States, the Court held 
that Apprendi applies not only to facts that increase the 
statutory maximum, but also facts that increase the mandatory 
minimum.52 Therefore, “any fact that increases the mandatory 
minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.”53 
While Chief Judge Roberts’s dissenting opinion disagreed with 
the application of Apprendi in the context of mandatory 
minimums, he described the Apprendi rule as “draw[ing] its 
legitimacy from two primary principles: (1) common law 
understandings of the ‘elements’ of a crime, and (2) the need to 
preserve the jury as a ‘strong barrier’ between defendants and 
the State.”54 
 
 49 See id. at 248. 
 50 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 487-90. 
 51 Id. at 489-90 (footnote omitted). 
 52 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
 53 Id. at 2153. 
 54 Id. at 2170 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Three days after Alleyne, the Court 
issued another opinion concerning the Apprendi exception in Descamps v. United 
States. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). In Descamps, the Court 
limited the amount of information a sentencing court can consider when determining 
whether the defendant’s prior conviction falls under the ACCA as a “violent felony.” Id. at 
2281-82.; see also Daniel Richman, Opinion Analysis: When Is a Burglary Not a Burglary?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2013, 11:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinion-
analysis-when-is-a-burglary-not-a-burglary/ (“Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment 
just to make clear that he still wants Almendarez-Torres dead.”). 
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III.  THE JUVENILE ADJUDICATION AS “PRIOR CONVICTION” 
DILEMMA 
A. The “Armed Career Criminal Act” 
Apprendi dealt with a state law, but the application of 
the “conviction exception” has frequently arisen under the 
ACCA, a federal act.55 The ACCA mandates a 15-year 
minimum period of incarceration for defendants convicted of 
possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924, if the 
defendant previously was convicted of three or more “violent 
felonies” or “serious” drug offenses.56 
The ACCA has forced many federal courts of appeals to 
take up the issue of whether a defendant’s juvenile adjudication 
should count as a prior conviction.57 The act defines “conviction” 
as “includ[ing] a finding that a person has committed an act of 
juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.”58 While the 
ACCA includes a juvenile adjudication in its definition of 
conviction, the adjudication still must be a “conviction” under the 
Apprendi exception, or else its use as a mandatory sentencing 
enhancement without submission to a jury constitutes a violation 
of due process. 
As the language of the ACCA specifically indicates that 
Congress intended for a juvenile delinquency adjudication to 
count as a predicate conviction, federal circuit courts have 
frequently been tasked with determining whether a juvenile 
adjudication counts as an exception under Apprendi in the 
context of the ACCA.59 The courts have also been faced with the 
same constitutional question in light of similar state laws.60 
 
 55 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2011); See Daniel Richman, Opinion Analysis: When Is a 
Burglary a “Burglary?”, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 4, 2013, 10:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2013/01/argument-preview-when-is-a-burglary-a-burglary/ (“Because its application 
brings some of the federal system’s harshest mandatory penalties, and requires federal 
courts to categorize a diverse range of prior state convictions . . . the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (‘ACCA’), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), has provided the Court with considerable 
business (and a fair amount of exasperation).”). See, e.g., supra notes 1-7 (describing 
the application of the ACCA in the Washington case). 
 56 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(1) (2012). 
 57 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012). 
 58 Id. 
 59 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 426 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011); United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 262-65 (4th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25 (1st 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238 (2008). 
 60 See, e.g., Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
550 U.S. 933 (2007). These laws are commonly referred to as “Three Strikes Laws.” 
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B. The Federal Courts of Appeals on Juvenile 
Adjudications and Apprendi 
A vast majority of federal circuit courts have decided 
that a juvenile adjudication counts as a “conviction,” making it 
an “exception” under Apprendi.61 While some courts of appeals 
have carefully laid out the legal analysis under Apprendi,62 
others have deferred to previous decisions in the state courts or 
other circuit courts, relying on the fact that there is no “clearly 
established federal law” in this area.63 
One potentially confounding issue is that while the ACCA 
is a federal statute and the Apprendi exception is a constitutional 
due process concern, a previous juvenile adjudication will almost 
always be determined under the state’s specific legal procedures 
for juveniles.64 Even juveniles who violate federal law are 
typically prosecuted by state authorities in the state’s juvenile 
system unless the state “does not have jurisdiction or refuses to 
assume jurisdiction over [the] juvenile.”65 Therefore, the state’s 
procedures and characterization of juvenile adjudications is 
relevant to the overall constitutional analysis. 
While a majority of the courts of appeals now hold that 
a juvenile adjudication should count as a previous conviction, 
or a “strike” for ACCA purposes, the first case to address this 
issue determined otherwise. In United States v. Tighe, decided 
in 2001, the year following Apprendi, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that a juvenile adjudication does not 
count as a “conviction” and therefore may not be used as a 
sentencing enhancement under the ACCA.66 In Tighe, the 
district court sentenced the defendant to a minimum term of 15 
years in prison after the sentencing judge included a 1988 
juvenile adjudication of reckless endangerment, robbery, and 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as a prior conviction for a 
 
 61 See Welch, 604 F.3d at 426; Wright, 594 F.3d at 263-65; Matthews, 498 
F.3d at 36; United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 1105 (2008); Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1151-52; United States v. Burge 407 F.3d 1183, 
1186-87 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005); United States v. Jones, 332 
F.3d 688, 697-98 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004); United States v. 
Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1031-33 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003). 
 62 See, e.g., Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1031-33; United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 
1187, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 63 See Boyd, 467 F.3d 1139 at 1142; Welch, 604 F.3d 408. See infra note 102 
for the standard of review used when the federal court hears a habeas corpus petition 
after the defendant was sentenced in state court. 
 64 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 at 1194-95. 
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violent felony.67 The Ninth Circuit explained that Congress’s 
characterization of a juvenile adjudication as a “prior 
conviction” under the ACCA “ignores the significant 
constitutional differences between adult convictions and juvenile 
adjudications.”68 The court stressed that “[n]either Apprendi, nor 
Almendarez-Torres—the case upon which Apprendi relied to 
create the ‘prior conviction’ exception to its general rule—
specifically addressed the unique issues that distinguish 
juvenile adjudications from adult convictions, such as the lack of 
a right to a jury trial in most juvenile adjudications.”69 
The Ninth Circuit looked carefully at United States v. 
Jones,70 a Supreme Court case decided just before Apprendi and 
upon which the Apprendi court relied.71 Although Jones did not 
deal with a case involving a prior conviction, the Supreme 
Court took the opportunity to discuss why convictions were 
different from other elements that may increase a defendant’s 
sentence: “One basis for that constitutional distinctiveness [of 
prior convictions] is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other 
consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense 
. . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through 
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt[,] and 
jury trial guarantees.”72 The Tighe court continued the Supreme 
Court’s analysis to reason that 
Jones’ recognition of prior convictions as a constitutionally 
permissible sentencing factor was rooted in the concept that prior 
convictions have been, by their very nature, subject to the 
fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections intended to 
guarantee the reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice, 
reasonable doubt[,] and the right to a jury trial.73 
Thus, the Tighe court pointed out that the basis for an 
exception for convictions is inapplicable in juvenile adjudications 
obtained without a right to a jury trial.74 The Tighe court then 
 
 67 Id. at 1190. 
 68 Id. at 1192-93. 
 69 Id. at 1193. 
 70 Id.; see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243-52 (1999) (holding 
that a federal statute requiring a greater term of imprisonment when the offense 
resulted in “serious bodily injury or death” constitutes separate elements of the offense 
which must be presented to the jury). 
 71 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 472-73 (2000). 
 72 Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 249). 
 73 Id. at 1193. 
 74 Id. The Tighe court did not address the argument that some states may provide 
juvenile delinquency defendants with the right to a jury trial as Tighe himself did not have 
a right to a jury trial under Oregon state law. “It does not matter to this analysis whether 
any state provides the right to a jury trial for juvenile adjudications. It is undisputed that 
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completed the analysis by looking at whether the conviction 
exception should be extended to include nonjury adjudications 
and decided not to take such a step.75 The court reasoned that 
such an extension of the Apprendi holding would be 
unwarranted given “[t]he Apprendi Court’s serious reservations 
about the reasoning of Almendarez-Torres [which] counsel 
against any extension of that opinion’s holding.”76 
In the year following Tighe, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed the exact same issue in United States v. 
Smalley, which also focused on the use of a juvenile adjudication 
as a “conviction” under the ACCA.77 In Smalley, the defendant 
had multiple prior juvenile adjudications which the trial court 
counted as “convictions” to increase his sentence.78 The Smalley 
court noted that the language of the ACCA indicated that 
Congress intended for juvenile adjudications to count as 
convictions, “[b]ut the issue of whether juvenile adjudications 
can be characterized as prior convictions for Apprendi purposes 
is a constitutional question implicating Mr. Smalley’s right not 
to be deprived of liberty without due process of law.”79 The 
court then went on to describe the holding of Tighe, noting it 
was the only federal court case on point.80 
The Smalley court disagreed with the Tighe holding, 
reasoning that the Court’s opinion in Apprendi did not take a 
position on what constitutes sufficient procedural safeguards in 
every situation: 
We think that while the Court established what constitutes 
sufficient procedural safeguards (a right to jury trial and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made findings 
under a lesser standard of proof), the Court did not take a position 
on possibilities that lie between these two poles.81 
 
Tighe was not provided a jury when he was adjudged a juvenile delinquent in Oregon . . . .” 
Id. at 1194 n.4. Therefore, the court did not consider whether a juvenile adjudication based 
on a jury verdict would count as a “conviction” under Apprendi. Id. 
 75 Id. at 1194. 
 76 Id. “Even though it is arguable . . . Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly 
decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the 
recidivist issue were contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision’s validity and we 
need not revisit it for purposes of our decision today to treat the case as a narrow 
exception to the general rule we recalled at the outset.” Id. (quoting Apprendi v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000)). 
 77 United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1031 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 78 Id. at 1031. 
 79 Id. at 1031-32 (internal quotations omitted). 
 80 Id. at 1032. 
 81 Id. 
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The Smalley court “conclude[d] that the question of 
whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt from 
Apprendi’s general rule should not turn on the narrow parsing 
of words, but on an examination of whether juvenile 
adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due 
process of law is not offended by such an exemption.”82 The court 
then determined that they are,83 went on to list the many other 
procedural safeguards available to juvenile defendants,84 and 
concluded by stating that a jury in a juvenile proceeding is not 
constitutionally required under McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.85 
The Third Circuit soon faced the same issue in United 
States v. Jones, where the court held that a nonjury juvenile 
adjudication counts as a conviction under the Apprendi 
exception.86 The court adopted the reasoning of the Smalley court, 
stating “we find nothing in Apprendi or Jones, two cases relied 
upon by the Tighe court and [the defendant] on this appeal, 
that requires us to hold that prior nonjury juvenile 
adjudications that afforded all required due process safeguards 
cannot be used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA.”87 
While the defendant, Jones, lost in front of the Third 
Circuit, he succeeded on a subsequent appeal on the only basis 
available to him—the fact that he was unrepresented by 
 
 82 Id. at 1032-33. 
 83 Id. 
 84 “For starters, juvenile defendants have the right to notice, the right to 
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against 
self-incrimination. A judge in a juvenile proceeding, moreover, must find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt before he or she can convict.” Id. at 1033 (internal citations omitted). 
Interestingly, now that the court has reasoned juvenile adjudications to be counted as 
prior convictions, the court uses the term “convict” rather than the proper procedural 
term, “adjudicate.” 
 85 Id. See generally McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 86 United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003). A year earlier, the 
Third Circuit had avoided having to make a definitive ruling on the precise issue by 
holding that, in the case before it, the juvenile adjudication did not constitute a “violent 
felony” under the language of the ACCA. United States v. Richardson, 313 F.3d 121, 
127 (3d Cir. 2002). The Richardson court noted that, “as Richardson’s case well 
illustrates, [the ACCA] provides for dramatically increased penalties.” Id. at 123. The 
trial court applied the ACCA enhancement to Richardson’s case by counting a “juvenile 
adjudication for robbery and other offenses, along with two adult convictions for 
possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute.” Id. The court noted that if the 
enhancement did not apply, Richardson’s sentence would have been limited to a ten 
year statutory maximum, and he likely would have been sentenced within the guideline 
range of eight and a third to ten years. Id. (emphasis added). If the ACCA enhancement 
applied, Richardson faced a minimum sentence of fifteen years, with sentencing 
guidelines of roughly nineteen and a half to twenty four years. Id. (emphasis added). The 
trial court, counting the juvenile adjudication as a conviction, sentenced Richardson to 
235 months, or roughly nineteen and a half years in prison—nearly twice the maximum 
allowable period of incarceration if no such enhancement applied. Id. 
 87 Id. 
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counsel at his juvenile adjudication.88 If juvenile adjudications 
count as convictions, then federal defendants are bound by 
Custis v. United States, a 1994 Supreme Court case holding 
that “a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding . . . has no 
[ ]  right (with the sole exception of convictions obtained in 
violation of the right to counsel) to collaterally attack prior 
convictions.”89 Therefore, if juvenile adjudications count as 
convictions under federal laws such as the ACCA, then the only 
basis on which a defendant may attack the validity of his prior 
adjudication was if he or she was unrepresented by counsel at 
the proceeding.90 Any other suggested procedural deficits are 
insufficient. 
Following the Third Circuit, other federal appellate 
courts began to almost uniformly adopt reasoning similar to 
Smalley and hold that juvenile adjudications count as 
convictions and therefore fall under the Apprendi exception.91 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals “base[d] [its] holding on 
the reasoning of . . . Smalley and Jones.”92 The Sixth,93 First,94 
Fourth,95 and Seventh96 Circuits followed suit over the next five 
years, echoing the reasoning that juvenile adjudications are 
 
 88 See United States v. Jones, No. 2:01-CR-0136, 2006 WL 2939744 at *1-3 
(W.D. Penn., Oct. 13, 2006). The court’s opinion is noteworthy as it anecdotally sheds 
light on the possibility of procedural deficits in juvenile adjudications. The certified 
record of the defendant’s adjudication was silent regarding whether he was represented 
by counsel. Id. at *1. At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant Jones testified that he 
was not represented by counsel during his juvenile adjudication and the juvenile court 
judge never inquired whether he wanted counsel. Id. at *2. Jones also testified that he 
never took the stand, he did not cross-examine any witnesses, and his co-defendant’s 
counsel did not cross-examine any witnesses. Id. Finally, he testified that the hearing 
lasted 10 minutes. Id. “Jones testified that he did not appeal the Juvenile Adjudication 
because he lacked the resources or knowledge to do so.” Id. The juvenile court judge 
could not recall the specifics of Jones’ case, although he “conceded that he may not have 
asked the parent of an unrepresented co-defendant whether the defendant waived his 
right to counsel if [he] mistakenly thought the attorney present at the hearing was 
representing both co-defendants.” Id. at *3. 
 89 See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). 
 90 Id. 
 91 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011); United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238 (2008); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied, 550 U.S. 933 (2007); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1105 (2008); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005). 
 92 Burge, 407 F.3d at 1190. 
 93 Crowell, 493 F.3d at 750-51. 
 94 Matthews, 498 F.3d at 35-36. 
 95 Wright, 594 F.3d at 264. 
 96 Welch, 604 F.3d at 429. 
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just as reliable and are afforded with all the protections 
constitutionally required. 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, which originally decided 
Tighe, narrowed the holding even more when the court 
addressed the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance 
sentences under state law in Boyd v. Newland.97 In Boyd, the 
state court considered the defendant’s prior nonjury juvenile 
adjudication in deciding to increase his sentence.98 The Ninth 
Circuit reiterated its holding from Tighe, stating: 
We have held that the Apprendi “prior conviction” exception 
encompasses only those proceedings that provide a defendant with 
the procedural safeguards of a jury trial and of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Consequently, we do not recognize nonjury 
juvenile adjudications as “convictions” falling within the Apprendi 
exception, and ordinarily we do not allow sentencing enhancements 
based on such adjudications.99 
The court, however, continued to recognize the dilemma 
that, in the years following Tighe, California state courts 
disagreed with the holding and have declined to follow it.100 The 
court also acknowledged that subsequent federal appellate 
court decisions in other circuits disagreed with their 
interpretation.101 Faced with conflicting interpretations the 
court stated: 
Although we are not suggesting that Tighe was incorrectly decided, 
as some of these varying interpretations of Apprendi suggest, the 
opinion does not represent clearly established federal law ‘as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ In general, 
Ninth Circuit precedent remains persuasive authority in 
determining what is clearly established federal law. But in the face 
of authority that is directly contrary to Tighe, and in the absence of 
explicit direction from the Supreme Court, we cannot hold that the 
California courts’ use of Petitioner’s juvenile adjudication as a 
sentencing enhancement was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.102 
 
 97 See generally Boyd, 467 F.3d 1139. 
 98 Id. at 1151. 
 99 Id. at 1151-52 (citations omitted). 
 100 See id. at 1152. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. (citations omitted). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was deciding 
a habeas corpus petition arising from a state court judgment, such a deferential 
standard of review was required under federal law: 
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to a judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 
unless the adjudication of the claim— 
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Taking Tighe and Boyd together now leads to an 
incongruous result: in the state of California, a defendant’s 
juvenile adjudication counts as a conviction under Apprendi 
when the defendant is prosecuted under state law while that 
exact same adjudication may not qualify as a conviction under 
federal law. In other words, the use of the adjudication to 
enhance a sentence under state law is constitutionally valid, 
while that same use under federal law is a violation of the 
defendant’s constitutional right to due process. 
When the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Welch v. 
United States followed the reasoning of the other circuits and 
held that a juvenile adjudication counts as a conviction under 
the Apprendi exception, Judge Posner wrote a strong dissenting 
opinion.103 His dissent focuses on two distinct reasons why a 
juvenile adjudication should not count as a conviction: the 
different procedures and different objectives in the juvenile 
court system.104  
In terms of different procedures, Judge Posner begins by 
recognizing that a juvenile adjudication “is best described as 
‘quasi-criminal.’”105 His opinion further acknowledges that 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania holds that a jury is not required in a 
juvenile court proceeding to imprison (i.e. “ remand”) a juvenile, 
[b]ut whether a juvenile can be imprisoned on the basis of findings 
made by a juvenile-court judge rather than by a jury is different 
from whether a “conviction” so procured (if it should even be called a 
“conviction”) is the kind of “prior conviction” to which the Court 
referred in Apprendi, namely a conviction that can be used to jack up 
a person’s sentence beyond what would otherwise be the statutory 
maximum.106 
Posner points out that the Apprendi Court implied the 
predicate conviction would be determined by a jury;  
[o]therwise[,] why does the Supreme Court require that any fact, as 
distinct from a conviction, used to enhance a sentence be a fact found 
by a jury (unless of course the defendant waived a jury)? Why didn’t 
 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States[.] 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2011). 
 103 See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 429-32 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, 
J., dissenting). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 430. 
 106 Id. at 430-31. 
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the Court just say that the fact must be found by a reliable 
means?107 
Posner notes that the Court in Jones v. United States 
specifically pointed out that “a prior conviction must itself have 
been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, 
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.”108 These three 
procedural requirements are not explicitly stated in Apprendi 
and many courts considered the absence of such a statement in 
determining that juvenile adjudications should count as prior 
convictions,109 essentially reading the Apprendi holding in a 
vacuum. Posner argues: 
The Court in Apprendi did not take [these three procedural 
requirements] back when it said that  
if a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by 
statute when an offense is committed under certain 
circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss 
of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are 
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should 
not—at the moment the State is put to proof of those 
circumstances—be deprived of protections that have, until 
that point, unquestionably attached.  
The defendant in this case was not “deprived of protections” that had 
attached to his juvenile-court proceeding.110 
Although Posner does not explicitly say so, he seems to 
suggest that the language in Apprendi naturally follows from 
Jones. How else do we know what “protections” the Court is 
referring to? Furthermore, while the Apprendi Court did not 
overrule Almendarez-Torres, the Court left it on extremely narrow 
footing,111 which is telling considering that Almendarez-Torres 
involved predicate convictions that actually were subject to the 
same procedural protections, including the right to a jury trial.112 
The next section of Posner’s dissent is particularly 
interesting as it puts forth novel arguments and employs 
language similar to recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
punishment of juveniles. Posner discusses the objectives of the 
juvenile court system as constituting a concern separate and 
 
 107 Id. at 431. 
 108 Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999)). 
 109 Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 431 (7th Cir. 20120) (Posner, J., 
dissenting). 
 110 Id. (citations omitted). 
 111 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000). 
 112 Id. at 488. 
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distinct from the procedures of the juvenile system.113 This part 
of Posner’s opinion responds to the argument previously 
articulated by other courts of appeals that a nonjury juvenile 
adjudication which provides the defendant all the procedural due 
process afforded under McKeiver, cannot “become” a due 
process violation later down the road just because it is used to 
enhance an adult sentence.114 The basic argument is simply: 
once constitutional, always constitutional. Posner challenges 
this assumption, arguing that 
[t]he constitutional protections to which juveniles have been held to 
be entitled have been designed with a different set of objectives in 
mind than just recidivist enhancement. So the mere fact that a 
juvenile had all the process he was entitled to doesn’t make his 
juvenile conviction equivalent, for purposes of recidivist 
enhancement, to adult convictions.115 
Posner then continues to challenge the McKeiver court’s 
assumption that juvenile adjudications determined by judges 
are just as reliable as criminal convictions by juries.116 Posner 
points to subsequent research suggesting that this is not the 
case.117 He expresses a major concern which is “[o]f particular 
relevance to Apprendi [that] the literature finds that judges are 
more likely to convict in juvenile cases than juries are in 
criminal cases.”118 Posner suggests several reasons to explain 
this phenomenon: 
Juvenile-court judges are exposed to inadmissible evidence; they 
hear the same stories from defendants over and over again, leading 
them to treat defendants’ testimony with skepticism; they become 
chummy with the police and apply a lower standard of scrutiny to 
the testimony of officers whom they have come to trust; and they 
make their decisions alone rather than as a group and so their 
 
 113 Welch, 604 F.3d 431-34 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 114 See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 115 Welch, 604 F.3d at 431-32 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner makes the 
comparison to a guilty conviction for a military crime, obtained in front of a military 
commission without the right to a jury trial, being later used to enhance a “conviction of a 
conventional crime” and concludes that “would stretch Apprendi awfully far.” Id. at 432. 
 116 Id. at 432. 
 117 Id. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a 
Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 260 (2007) (arguing 
that juveniles make “less competent trial defendants” and “also tend to be more 
compliant and suggestible during police interrogations, two traits which are risk 
factors for false confessions”); see generally Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, 
Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile 
Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 556 (1998) (arguing “juries are 
generally more likely than judges to be fair and just triers of fact on the issue of guilt or 
innocence in a criminal or delinquency case”). 
 118 Welch, 604 F.3d 408 at 432. 
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decisions lack the benefits of group deliberation. It would be hasty to 
conclude that juvenile-court judges are more prone to convict the 
innocent than juries are. But if it is true that juvenile defendants 
fare worse before judges than they would before juries—if there is 
reason to think that trial by jury would alter the outcomes in a 
nontrivial proportion of juvenile cases—one cannot fob off the 
Apprendi argument with the observation that a jury makes no 
difference.119 
In addition to a greater likelihood that judges will find 
the defendant delinquent, Posner argues that juvenile 
delinquency defendants are also less likely to appeal or seek 
postconviction relief.120 Finally, Posner expresses special concern 
that the majority of the court may be deciding the issue based 
upon a “circuit scorecard, without independent consideration of 
the issues”121 and finds it “telling” that the government is 
unable “to give a reasoned basis” for its position that a juvenile 
adjudication should count as a conviction.122 He concludes with 
a call to the Supreme Court, as “only the [Court] can decide 
authoritatively what its decisions mean.”123 
C. Juveniles as a Class Distinguishable from Adults 
Although McKeiver v. Pennsylvania stands as the last 
case ruling on what procedures are constitutionally required in 
juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Court has decided cases 
within the last seven years expressly concerning the treatment 
and punishment of juveniles under the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.124 While the 
 
 119 Id. (emphasis added). While Judge Posner comments that it would be 
“hasty to conclude juvenile-court judges are more prone to convict the innocent than 
juries are,” some scholarship has argued that juveniles are at special risk of being 
wrongfully convicted. See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 117. Drizin and Luloff argue that 
juveniles are at special risk for wrongful convictions primarily because they “make less 
competent trial defendants” and exhibit “risk factors for false confessions.” Id. at 260. 
While those factors exist regardless of whether the fact finder at trial is a judge or jury, 
they further argue that “[t]he risk of wrongful convictions in juvenile court proceedings 
may also be increased by a lack of many of the due process protections afforded adult 
criminal defendants,” as well as “the fact that few juvenile cases are appealed and even 
fewer post-conviction and habeas cases are filed involving juveniles.” Id. at 260; Martin 
Guggenheim and Randy Hertz take an approach which strongly supports Posner’s 
assertion and argues that while juries are not necessarily more likely to reach the 
“correct” outcome, they provide a higher quality of factfinding than bench trials. See 
Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 117, at 553, 562-82. 
 120 Welch, 604 F.3d 408 at 432. 
 121 Id. at 431. 
 122 Id. at 432. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Gault line of cases determined the procedures afforded to 
juveniles in the juvenile court system specifically, this line of 
cases dealt with the treatment of juveniles in the adult 
criminal system as all of the defendants were prosecuted and 
sentenced as adults.125 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the execution 
of juveniles who were under 18 years old at the time of their 
crimes constituted cruel and unusual punishment barred by 
the Eighth Amendment.126 The Court focused on juveniles as a 
group distinguishable from adults, outlining “[t]hree general 
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults [which] 
demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be 
classified among the worst offenders.”127 The Court found that 
juveniles, in comparison to adults, have a lack of maturity, a 
vulnerability to peer pressure, and a still-evolving character.128 
The Court argued that these differences mean that juveniles’ 
“irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of 
an adult.”129 “From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to 
equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a 
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies 
will be reformed.”130 The Court thus concluded that, in light of 
such diminished capacity, the justifications of the death 
penalty of retribution and deterrence do not apply to juveniles 
with the same force as adults.131 
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Supreme 
Court addressed the imposition of life without parole on juveniles 
who did not commit homicide and held such punishment to be 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.132 The Graham 
Court summarized Roper as “establish[ing] that because 
juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of 
the most severe punishments.”133 In determining whether the 
punishment was proportional to the crime under the Eighth 
 
 125 See generally Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2445; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper, 543 
U.S. 551. 
 126 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (2005). 
 127 Id. at 569. 
 128 Id. at 569-70. 
 129 Id. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. at 571. The Court’s holding is especially noteworthy given that the 
beginning of its opinion was devoted to outlining the callous nature of the murder 
committed by the seventeen-year-old defendant. Id. at 555-58. One of the State’s 
aggravating factors in seeking the death penalty was that the murder “involved depravity 
of mind and was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman.” Id. at 557. 
 132 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 133 Id. at 2026. 
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Amendment, the Court concluded that, “compared to an adult 
murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill 
has a twice diminished moral culpability. The age of the 
offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the 
analysis.”134 As in its Roper analysis, the Court addressed the 
State’s justifications of retribution and deterrence and 
concluded them to be insufficient.135 The Court’s conclusion that 
retribution was an inadequate justification was directly related 
to its assessment of the relative culpability of juveniles, 
stating, 
Retribution is a legitimate reason to punish, but it cannot support 
the sentence at issue here. Society is entitled to impose severe 
sanctions on a juvenile nonhomicide offender to express its 
condemnation of the crime and to seek restoration of the moral 
imbalance caused by the offense. But [t]he heart of the retribution 
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the 
personal culpability of the criminal offender. And as Roper observed, 
“[w]hether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral 
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the 
victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with 
an adult.”136 
The analysis of the diminished culpability of juveniles is central to 
the Graham opinion as the Court does not hold life without parole 
for non-homicide adult offenders to be unconstitutional. 
The most recent Supreme Court case on juvenile 
offenders as a group distinct from adults is Miller v. Alabama, 
decided in 2012. In Miller, the Court held that, even in the case 
of homicide offenses, “mandatory life without parole for those 
under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments.’”137 Unlike Roper and Graham, Miller did not hold 
that a type of punishment was unlawful based on the category of 
the offender; instead, the Court held that a type of punishment, 
while lawful, was unconstitutional if mandatorily applied to 
juveniles.138 Only the procedure was at issue. The reasoning for 
the constitutional violation is that the state’s mandatory 
sentencing “scheme prevents those meting out punishment from 
considering a ‘juvenile’s lessened culpability’ and greater ‘capacity 
for change.’”139 Such a scheme essentially ignores the precepts of 
 
 134 Id. at 2027 (emphasis added). 
 135 Id. at 2028. 
 136 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)). 
 137 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Roper and Graham “that children are constitutionally different 
from adults for purposes of sentencing.”140 The Court reiterated 
that the recognition of juveniles as having diminished culpability 
compared to adults rests on common sense as well as the support 
of biology and social science.141 
While the defendants in Miller faced prosecution and 
sentencing in the adult criminal system, the Court’s reasoning 
echoes the original justification for the juvenile court system, 
stating that “[l]ife without parole forswears altogether the 
rehabilitative ideal. It reflects an irrevocable judgment about 
[an offender’s] value and place in society, at odds with a child’s 
capacity for change.”142 In addition to reiterating the recognition 
from Roper and Graham that juveniles are less culpable than 
adults who have committed the same crime, Miller adds a 
decidedly different analysis. Miller ruled the procedure of 
mandatorily imposing the punishment, as opposed to the 
punishment itself, constitutionally impermissible.143 Such 
procedure ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment because it did 
not take into account the lessened culpability of juveniles and 
instead completely equated juveniles with adults. 
D. Apprendi after Miller and Graham 
Since deciding Apprendi in 2000, the Supreme Court 
has not ruled on whether juvenile delinquency adjudications 
count as convictions and therefore need not be submitted to a 
jury during sentencing.144 As the federal courts of appeals have 
struggled with that question, the Supreme Court’s understanding 
and conception of juveniles has evolved as evidenced by its 
decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller. The language of these 
cases all stress the lessened culpability of juveniles and the 
“rehabilitative ideal,”145 justifications upon which the juvenile 
 
 140 Id. at 2464. 
 141 Id. at 2464-65. 
 142 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 143 Id. at 2466. 
 144 But see infra notes 151-58 for a discussion on recent petitions for certiorari 
and recent indications which could suggest the Court may be amenable to addressing 
the issue soon. 
 145 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (“Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is 
recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply 
to them with lesser force than to adults.”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (“[The State’s] 
judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for 
change and limited moral culpability.”); Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (“So Graham and 
Roper and our individualized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a State’s 
harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.”). 
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court system was originally founded.146 These cases have made 
it vitally important for the Supreme Court to take up the issue 
and explicitly rule on whether juvenile delinquency adjudications 
are convictions under the language of Apprendi. 
As previously discussed, the language of Apprendi itself 
demonstrated the Court’s already apparent uneasiness with its 
holding in Almendarez-Torres, allowing a “conviction 
exception.”147 In 2011, the Court considered granting certiorari 
petitions in cases that challenged the Almendarez-Torres 
decision altogether—choosing to relist the cases and call for 
briefs.148 This is an even broader issue given that if the Court 
were to overrule Almendarez-Torres, it would get rid of the 
problem with the use of juvenile delinquencies altogether as 
there would no longer be a “conviction exception.” The Court 
ultimately denied certiorari in those petitions.149 
In May 2012, before the Court decided Miller, it 
considered granting certiorari in Staunton v. California,150 a 
case in which the court used a juvenile delinquency adjudication 
under Apprendi to increase the defendant’s sentence.151 The 
Court did not immediately deny certiorari, but instead relisted 
the case for another conference to consider the petition.152 In 
fact, the Court actually requested the record in the Staunton 
case.153 Despite eventually denying certiorari,154 the Court’s 
actions suggest a willingness to eventually take up the issue if 
presented with amenable facts.155 Granting certiorari in a case 
 
 146 See FELD, supra note 14, at 60. 
 147 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000). 
 148 John Elwood, Re-list Watch: Will the Court Reconsider Almendarez-Torres?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 27, 2011, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/re-list-
watch-will-the-court-reconsider-almendarez-torres/. 
 149 Vazquez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2011); Ayala-Segoviano v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 1465 (2011). 
 150 See Staunton v. California, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) for denial of certiorari. 
For the case below, see People v. Huggins, No. H036254, 2011 WL 4852287 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2011) (Mr. Staunton was a co-defendant in People v. Huggins.) 
 151 John Elwood, Relist (and Hold) Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 17, 2012, 
10:55 AM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/relist-and-hold-watch-19/. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Staunton v. California, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012). 
 155 Though the Court eventually denied the petition for certiorari, Staunton’s 
case and the trial court’s decision offered a less than perfect set of facts. Id. Staunton’s 
prior juvenile adjudication that counted as a “strike” under California state law was a 
juvenile offense for robbery committed fourteen years prior to the offense in question. 
See People v. Huggins, No. H036254, 2011 WL 4852287 at *3 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 
13, 2011) (Mr. Staunton was a co-defendant in People v. Huggins.) In addition to the 
juvenile offense, however, Staunton had eight prior felony convictions, several prior 
misdemeanor convictions, was on parole when he was convicted of the offense in 
question, and had violated parole at least once before. Id. at *2. The trial court denied 
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involving the use of a juvenile delinquency adjudication under 
Apprendi would allow the Court to revisit the original 
justification of the Almendarez-Torres “conviction exception” 
without forcing its hand on whether or not that decision should 
be entirely overruled. 
If the Supreme Court does not choose to directly address 
the use of juvenile adjudications within the “conviction 
exception” in light of its decisions in Graham and Miller, it seems 
unlikely the lower courts will do so. While some circuit courts 
have ruled on the use of juvenile delinquency adjudications since 
Roper was decided in 2005, none have explicitly considered any of 
the language or reasoning in the Roper line of cases.156 That is 
likely because: (1) the Roper cases were all decided based on the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment 
rather than on due process grounds,157 and (2) all of the Roper 
cases involved juveniles tried as adults in the adult criminal 
system, and thus did not implicate juvenile adjudications. No 
federal court of appeals has ruled on the use of juvenile 
delinquency adjudications under Apprendi since Miller was 
decided in 2012.158 This is noteworthy because Miller deemed a 
process that equated juveniles and adults in terms of sentencing 
constitutionally offensive.159 What does this mean then for 
 
Staunton’s request to exclude the use of the juvenile adjudication as a prior strike 
based on “the facts and circumstances of not only this [juvenile] offense but Mr. 
Staunton’s background.” Id. at *3. The trial court also considered that Staunton had 
been convicted of two felony offenses in the time since the juvenile offense. Id. On 
appeal, the Sixth District declined to address the issue any further. Id. at *4. 
 156 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011); United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2010), cert 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238 (2008); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1105 (2008); Boyd v. Newland, 437 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 
2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 933 (2007); United States v. Burge 407 F.3d 1183 (11th 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005). 
 157 See Beth Caldwell, Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile 
Strikes as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 581-86 (2012) 
(arguing that, based on the reasoning of Graham v. Florida, the use of prior juvenile 
adjudications constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 158 While the Washington case discussed supra notes 1-2 & 4-7 was decided at 
the end of 2012 and thus was after Miller, the court decision makes no mention of 
Apprendi and it is not argued in the defendant-appellant’s brief. See United States v. 
Washington, 706 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2012); Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 5, United 
States v. Washington, 706 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-6339), 2012 WL 1074455 
at *11. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet decided on whether the use of 
juvenile adjudications is a violation of Apprendi. In dealing with state cases on habeas 
corpus claims, the Tenth Circuit has held a state court’s determination that such use is 
not a violation of Apprendi is “neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Supreme Court precedent.” See Harris v. Roberts, No. 12-3045, 2012 
WL2354433 at *2 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 159 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012). 
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treating juvenile delinquency adjudications to be equivalent to 
adult criminal convictions for the purposes of sentencing? 
E. Juvenile Adjudications Should Not Count Under the 
Apprendi “Conviction Exception” 
There are two separate bases on which the use of 
juvenile delinquency adjudications should not be counted as 
equivalent to prior convictions under Apprendi: (1) the fact that 
juvenile delinquency adjudications are not supported by a jury 
trial guarantee, which is assumed as a prerequisite under the 
language of Apprendi,160 and (2) recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence recognizing and reiterating that juveniles are less 
culpable than adults and more capable of rehabilitation. The 
second basis, in particular, would mark a return to the 
conception upon which the juvenile court was founded and the 
paramount justification for a separate court system for juveniles. 
1.  The Use of Juvenile Adjudications as “Prior 
Convictions” Is a Violation of Due Process Because 
They Are Not Supported by a Jury Trial Guarantee 
Because McKeiver has never been overturned, there is 
no constitutional right to a jury trial in a juvenile delinquency 
proceeding.161 While a juvenile adjudication obtained without a 
jury trial is therefore constitutionally valid, many scholars 
argue that the language and reasoning of the Apprendi opinion 
require that the defendant had a right to a jury trial even 
though the Court did not explicitly define a “conviction.”162 The 
question then becomes—why does the language of Apprendi 
suggest that a “conviction” must have been obtained with a 
right to a jury trial? What procedural safeguards underlie a 
right to a jury that would require it? 
Some authors have argued that the jury plays an 
important role in protecting against governmental oppression.163 
But the decision in McKeiver not to extend the right to a jury 
trial to juvenile court proceedings demonstrated that the Court 
 
 160 See infra note 165. 
 161 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 528 (1971). 
 162 See e.g., Feld, supra note 13; Abbott, supra note 13; Schneider supra note 
13; Thill, supra note 13. 
 163 See, e.g., Andrew Sokol, Comment, Juvenile Adjudications as Elevating 
Factors in Subsequent Adult Sentencing and the Structural Role of the Jury, 13 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 791, 804-09 (2011) (focusing on the institutional role of the jury as 
protection from tyranny by the government). 
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was only concerned with accurate fact-finding in order for the 
adjudication to be constitutionally sound.164 Many of the circuit 
courts arrived at their decisions regarding the use of juvenile 
adjudications by interpreting the holding of Apprendi to focus on 
the reliability of the previous proceeding.165 Therefore, the courts 
reason, if McKeiver holds that a right to a jury trial is not required 
for juveniles because judges are just as reliable, and Apprendi 
holds that convictions are exempted from going in front of a jury 
because convictions are reliable, then juvenile adjudications may be 
equated with convictions for the purpose of sentencing without 
violating the defendant’s right to due process.166 
But many critics, including Judge Posner,167 have 
challenged the factual basis of the McKeiver court’s assumption 
that judges are just as reliable as juries,168 leading others to 
argue that the unreliability of juvenile adjudications prohibit 
equating them with adult convictions.169 Others go as far as to 
argue that McKeiver should be overruled, which would result in 
a constitutional right to a jury trial during the juvenile 
delinquency proceeding.170 
Further, even if McKeiver were overruled and juveniles 
were granted the right to jury trials, there are still significant 
concerns that juvenile adjudications are less reliable than adult 
convictions based on the nature of juveniles themselves. 
Professor Steven Drizin and Greg Luloff suggest that a 
 
 164 FELD, supra note 14, at 104. 
 165 See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(juvenile adjudications are “so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such 
an exemption”); see also Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 166 See, e.g., Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033; see also Welch v. United States, 604 
F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 167 Welch, 604 F.3d at 432-34. 
 168 See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 117. 
 169 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 13, at 1120 (arguing that until McKeiver is 
overruled it is “unfair[ ]  [to use] procedurally deficient, factually unreliable convictions 
to enhance subsequent sentences. States which deny delinquents jury trials in the 
contemporary punitive juvenile justice system compound that inequity when they use 
those nominally rehabilitative sentences to extend terms of adult imprisonment.”); 
Abbott, supra note 13, at 91-92; Schneider, supra note 13, at 863 (arguing that juvenile 
adjudications without jury trials constitute “a deal between the state and the 
juvenile. . . . [where] the juvenile ideally receives treatment and in return surrenders 
certain procedural protections . . . . The state fails to hold up its end of the deal when it 
treats the juvenile adjudication as an adult conviction.”); Thill, supra note 13, at 90-98 
(arguing that the exception only applies narrowly to convictions obtained with a right 
to jury trial guarantee). But see Kennedy, supra note 13 (arguing that juvenile 
adjudications should fall under the conviction exception as they are reliable). 
 170 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 13, at 1124; Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile 
Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997) (arguing that the juvenile court should be abolished and 
youthfulness should be recognized as a mitigating factor in criminal proceedings). 
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multitude of factors may contribute to decreased reliability 
with juvenile adjudications as studies suggest juveniles are “at 
special risk of being wrongfully convicted . . . especially when it 
comes to false confessions” and developmental differences 
“make juveniles less competent trial defendants . . . [and] more 
compliant and suggestible during police interrogations.”171 The 
Supreme Court recognized in Graham v. Florida that some of 
“the features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them 
at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. . . . They 
are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers to 
aid in their defense.”172 Other scholars have been disturbed by the 
high incidence of waiver of counsel in the juvenile courts173 and 
even if the child is represented, some authors have argued that 
there is a strong concern for ineffective assistance of counsel in 
juvenile cases.174 Notably, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel would be brought on appeal and, as Judge Posner pointed 
out in his dissent in Welch, there is a much lower rate of appeal in 
juvenile court cases.175 Recently, Megan Annitto, Director of the 
Center for Law and Public Service at West Virginia University 
College of Law, examined data measuring the rates of juvenile 
appeals in 15 states and appellate decisions over a period of 10 
years.176 She described juvenile courts as “an area of the law 
where the appellate role and transparency to the public is 
overwhelmingly absent.”177 These findings and studies on 
reliability in the juvenile court system suggest that, even if 
Apprendi is read to only require a reliable previous adjudication, 
simply requiring jury trials will not necessarily make juvenile 
adjudications as reliable as adult convictions.178 
 
 171 Drizin & Luloff, supra note 117, at 257-60 (2007). 
 172 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010). 
 173 See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: 
Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577 (2002) (arguing that permitting 
juveniles to waive counsel constitutes a denial of the right to counsel and that due 
process requires that juvenile courts should not accept waiver of counsel by juveniles). 
 174 See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 771, 774 (2010). 
 175 See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., 
dissenting). 
 176 Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 672 (2012). 
 177 Id. 
 178 While the aforementioned findings on reliability rely heavily on social 
science and research as opposed to court opinions, the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Roper, Graham, and Miller all evinced a willingness to look to such research and 
findings when considering the relative culpability and rehabilitative capacity of 
juveniles. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-68 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-30 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-73 (2005). 
Therefore, if the Court decided primarily to focus on the reliability of juvenile 
 
2013] APPRENDI AFTER MILLER AND GRAHAM 375 
 
2.  Equating Prior Juvenile Adjudications with 
Convictions is a Violation of Due Process Because the 
Supreme Court Characterizes Juveniles as a Class 
Categorically Less Culpable than Adults 
Many scholars and authors have argued against 
juvenile adjudications falling under the “conviction exception” 
on the basis that such adjudications have not been subjected to 
a jury trial guarantee and, subsequently, are either not as 
reliable as convictions obtained by juries or do not provide 
adequate protection from governmental oppression.179 This note 
advances a second argument: based on the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of juveniles in Roper, Graham, and Miller as a class 
categorically less culpable than adults, juvenile adjudications 
are fundamentally different than adult convictions and therefore 
their use as mandatory sentence enhancements constitutes a 
violation of due process.180 
Over time, both the courts and the academic community 
have voiced doubts over whether the juvenile court system truly 
embraces the “rehabilitative ideal” upon which it was founded.181 
Even in McKeiver, despite holding that a right to a jury was not 
constitutionally required, the Court was still concerned with the 
failures of the juvenile court to live up to its intended purpose.182 
The Supreme Court’s most recent cases on juveniles, however, 
decided in the context of the Eighth Amendment, seem to signal 
a return to focus on lessened culpability and capacity for 
rehabilitation when determining appropriate punishment.183 As 
Professor Kristin Henning has written,  
The Supreme Court’s recent review of adolescent development 
research in Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons suggests that 
 
adjudications in making a future ruling, it is likely social science findings and data 
could again come into play. 
 179 See supra notes 170-81. 
 180 While this argument is based on the reasoning of Roper, Graham, and 
Miller, I am not arguing that the use of juvenile adjudications to increase mandatory 
sentences constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation. (For such an argument, see 
Beth Caldwell, supra note 157). Rather, the Court’s conception and understanding of 
juveniles, as developed in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, sheds light on how the 
Court may view adjudications resulting from a system specifically created to 
accommodate juveniles as distinct from adults in the area of due process. For a detailed 
discussion of such “constitutional borrowing,” see Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, 
Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459 (2010). 
 181 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 430 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, 
J., dissenting); Barry C. Feld, supra note 173. 
 182 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-45 (1971). 
 183 See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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policymakers may be heading in the wrong direction with juvenile 
court policy . . . . [T]he Supreme Court has been seemingly less 
reactionary and more attentive to science in its analysis of criminal 
justice issues involving children.184 
Additionally, the research upon which the Court has 
based such decisions “re-affirms the beliefs of the founders of 
the juvenile court.”185 
Juvenile adjudications are obtained in a system that is 
grounded in the purpose and design of accommodating juveniles 
as a class distinct from adults.186 This is different from the 
purpose of the adult criminal system. Roper, Graham, and Miller 
all demonstrate the Supreme Court’s decision that juveniles are 
categorically less culpable than adults.187 Essentially, the purpose 
of the juvenile system is to account for the differences described in 
the Roper line of cases—less culpability, less stigmatization, and 
greater opportunity for rehabilitation.188 Therefore, the use of 
juvenile adjudications under the Apprendi exception constitutes a 
due process violation by equating a juvenile adjudication with an 
adult conviction without any consideration of the relative 
culpability between the two.189 Under the view currently adopted 
by a majority of the courts, a defendant with three prior juvenile 
adjudications is automatically considered to be as deserving of 
punishment as a defendant with three prior adult convictions. 
This result runs afoul of the Roper line of cases. At the time when 
the offense was committed, the juvenile defendant was less 
culpable than an adult. The passage of time does not now make 
him equally culpable. 
The Court’s focus on the inappropriateness of equating 
the misconduct of juveniles with that of adults tracks from 
 
 184 Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due 
Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 17, 23 (2012). 
 185 Id. 
 186 FELD, supra note 14 at 60. 
 187 See generally Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper, 543 
U.S. 551; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011. 
 188 FELD, supra note 14 at 60. 
 189 Although Judge Posner does not focus on relative culpability, he briefly 
touches upon a similar argument in his dissenting opinion in Welch, arguing that just 
because the juvenile adjudication is constitutionally sound for the purpose of the 
juvenile court system does not render it constitutionally sound for all purposes:  
The constitutional protections to which juveniles have been held to be 
entitled have been designed with a different set of objectives in mind than 
just recidivist enhancement. So the mere fact that a juvenile had all the process 
he was entitled to doesn’t make his juvenile conviction equivalent, for the 
purposes of recidivist enhancements, to adult convictions. 
Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 431-32 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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Roper and is developed through Graham and Miller. Roper 
focused on the fact that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor child with those of 
an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s 
character deficiencies will be reformed.”190 While the Roper 
Court discussed the possibility of reform, a possibility that 
arguably applies with less persuasion in the case of an adult 
defendant with multiple offenses, the Court pointed out that 
the two social purposes served by the death penalty in that 
case were deterrence and retribution.191 The Court went on to 
state that “the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor 
as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law’s 
most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or 
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by 
reason of youth and immaturity.”192 
Following Roper, Graham also focused on the diminished 
culpability of juveniles.193 The Court directly discussed retribution 
as a possible justification for the imposition of a sentence of life 
without parole on a non-homicide juvenile offender.194 The Court 
stated that while “[r]etribution is a legitimate reason to 
punish, . . . ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a 
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender.’”195 Notably, the Court wrote: 
A sentence of life imprisonment without parole . . . cannot be 
justified by the goal of rehabilitation. The penalty forswears 
altogether the rehabilitative idea. By denying the defendant the 
right to reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable 
judgment about that person’s value and place in society. This 
judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide 
offender’s capacity for change and limited moral culpability.196 
The Graham Court’s discussion of the “rehabilitative 
ideal” is noteworthy because the Roper line of cases, including 
Graham itself, deals with juvenile offenders in the adult 
system. By discussing the importance of the rehabilitative ideal 
in this context, the Court attaches the rehabilitative ideal not 
to the system in which the sentence is imposed, but rather to 
the age of the person at the time the offense is committed. 
 
 190 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
 191 Id. at 571. 
 192 Id. at 570. 
 193 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27 (2010). 
 194 Id. at 2028. 
 195 Id. (citation omitted). 
 196 Id. at 2029-30. 
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Roper and Graham both focused on a type of sentence 
being unconstitutional when applied to juveniles. Roper 
prohibited the death penalty for all juveniles,197 while Graham 
prohibited life without parole for juveniles who did not commit 
a homicide offense.198 Miller focused on a type of sentence being 
unconstitutional when it was mandatorily applied.199 Even 
though the constitutional provision in question in Miller is still 
the Eighth Amendment, the constitutional deficiency arises out 
of the lack of process afforded the juvenile when life without 
parole is mandatorily applied.200 In rendering its decision, the 
Miller Court began with the premise that “Roper and Graham 
establish that children are constitutionally different from adults 
for purposes of sentencing.”201 The Miller Court focused on the 
fact that the mandatory process 
remov[es] youth from the balance—by subjecting a juvenile to the 
same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—[which] 
prohibit[s] a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s 
harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile 
offender. That contravenes Graham’s (and also Roper’s) foundational 
principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile 
offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.202 
In holding that a mandatory sentence was unconstitutional 
when applied to juveniles, the Court recognized that previous cases 
held that “a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual 
does not becom[e] so simply because it is mandatory.”203 However, 
“a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for 
children.”204 
Likewise, the Apprendi “conviction exception,” as it 
currently stands, may be viewed as a sentencing rule that is 
permissible for adults with prior adult convictions. It does not 
necessarily follow that the same sentencing rule must be 
constitutionally sound for adults with prior juvenile adjudications. 
The Roper line of cases stressed the lessened culpability of 
juveniles while Graham held that the sentencing process itself 
must take into account the lessened culpability of youth when 
such a severe sentence was imposed.205 These cases recognize 
 
 197 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (2005). 
 198 Graham,130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 199 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 2464. 
 202 Id. at 2466. 
 203 Id. at 2470 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204 Id. 
 205 See supra notes 191-200. 
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that the conviction of a juvenile, even within the adult system, 
is constitutionally different than the conviction of an adult for 
the same offense. Graham specifically held that even though a 
punishment may be constitutionally permissible, a sentencing 
process that does not take into account the lessened culpability of 
the juvenile can create a constitutional violation.206 Such reasoning 
implicates the use of juvenile adjudications for sentencing 
enhancements. While the sentence itself may be constitutionally 
permissible, a process that does not take into account the lessened 
culpability of a juvenile is constitutionally deficient. 
CONCLUSION 
There has long been an argument against using juvenile 
adjudications as sentencing enhancements because they were 
obtained without a right to a jury trial guarantee.207 Scholars 
argue that the language of Apprendi presupposes a jury trial 
guarantee in the prior proceeding and, additionally, juvenile 
adjudications may not be as reliable as previously assumed. 
But there is a second basis on which juvenile adjudications 
should not count as convictions for the purpose of sentencing 
enhancement—one that stands regardless of whether McKeiver is 
overturned. Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in Miller and 
Graham focuses on the nature of juveniles as fundamentally 
distinct from adults. A juvenile adjudication cannot simply be 
equated with an adult criminal conviction. A juvenile adjudication 
is obtained within a system that exists precisely to recognize a 
categorical distinction between children and adults. Even if such a 
system were supported by a jury trial guarantee, counting juvenile 
adjudications as convictions falling within the “conviction 
exception” of Apprendi violates the constitutionally guaranteed due 
process rights of the defendants. The Supreme Court has already 
provided the framework for this decision. All that remains now is 
for the Court to be presented with the correct set of facts. 
Rebecca J. Gannon† 
 
 206 Graham,130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 207 See supra notes 161-78. 
 †  J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; B.A., University of Notre 
Dame, 2009. I would like to thank Professor Cynthia Godsoe and the members of the 
Brooklyn Law Review for their insights and guidance. I would also like to thank my 
family for their support in the form of love as well as those gift cards that magically 
appear around finals time. 
